Good fences, good neighbours
Kanwal Sibal, The Indian Express
March 15, 2008
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/284543.html

Introduction: If China raises territorial issues to provoke India, it is because it has fewer stakes in improved ties than we do

For Tibetans, March 10, 1959 is the day of their national uprising against the Chinese, which culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India through Tawang. Indian authorities restricted this year’s commemorative demonstrations by Tibetans in Delhi; and their plans to organise a march on Lhasa, by crossing the border at an undisclosed point on an undisclosed date, are bound to be foiled by watchful Indian and Chinese agencies. The aim is to politically embarrass the Chinese, by exposing the Tibetan skeleton in their cupboard, just when China is engaged in image-building for the Olympics.

Tibet is at the heart of our border problem with China. Hu Jintao can well declaim that China’s stability is dependent on Tibet’s stability, but how can this be achieved if China refuses to deal with the Dalai Lama and keeps conflict alive by laying periodic claims to Arunachal Pradesh? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s January visit to Arunachal Pradesh elicited the usual Chinese protest against trespass into their territory. Although the protest was at a middle diplomatic level, it does reveal the iron in China’s posture and its indifference to Indian public opinion.

Such protests are hardly in tune with the relationship attained between the two countries. Indian and Chinese leaders meet regularly. A bilateral strategic dialogue of sorts has begun. They are working together at the East Asian Summit and ASEAN-linked fora like the ARF. They cooperate in WTO discussions or in those on climate change. China now has observer status at SAARC, dissolving our past paranoia about Chinese intrusions into India’s geographical space. Peace on the border is being maintained despite the periodic testing of our nerves by the Chinese in ‘disputed’ areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Bilateral confidence building measures now include joint military exercises. Trade between the two is increasing faster than predictions, with the target now raised to $60 billion by 2010.

If China raises territorial issues to provoke India, it is because it has fewer stakes in improved ties than we do, and the confidence of a stronger hand. Tibet has been subdued sufficiently with force and prosperity — the physical infrastructure for controlling and integrating it has been developed, including a railway line.

Militarily, China has an advantage on the border because of its easier terrain and better infrastructure. In the western sector, it holds a line even beyond its own claims. In the eastern sector, it withdrew voluntarily in 1962 and now claims more territory as part of ‘meaningful’ territorial adjustments.

It plays the Tibet card against us without compunction, undeterred by the fact that its own position on Tibet is contested by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people. With India unwilling to politically capitalise on the enormous goodwill the Tibetans and their spiritual leader have for it, China can afford to remain on the offensive. Adding to this disequilibrium is the widening economic gap. With more resources, China is investing heavily in advanced weapons technologies, which will widen the military gap as well.

Unlike Pakistan’s position vis-a-vis India, we have not made the resolution of the border dispute a pre-condition for normalising bilateral ties with China. This gives China reduced incentive to reach a settlement. While we may see our approach as mature, constructive and contributing to peace, the Chinese could easily view it as yielding and conciliatory. So, China profits from our diffidence. Its posture on the border keeps us off-balance politically and militarily, while imposing economic costs on us.

Periodic reports of China making incursions into our territory jitter India. India defensively claims that the incidents are confined to areas where the two sides have differing perceptions about the LAC. Our chief of army staff has earned criticism by suggesting shared culpability in transgressions across an undefined LAC. The rational approach would be to delineate these perceptions on the map, identify the pockets of overlapping claims and then find a solution. The two countries agreed to do this exercise sector by sector, but the Chinese reneged on the understanding in 2002 on specious grounds when the exercise moved from the middle to the western sector. In June 2003, we proposed a ‘political’ approach, which meant a reasonable give-and-take based on agreed political parameters and guiding principles. While the LAC approach pre-supposed only marginal adjustments of the border, the political approach has perversely allowed China to claim territory not under its control, thereby keeping the special representatives of the two sides from moving forward.

No Indian government can accept the kind of territorial concessions China wants in Arunachal Pradesh. Forty-five years after vacating Tawang, to seek to reclaim it indicates that they either doubt our resilience or don’t want a settlement for the moment. No great matter of principle is involved for them here. They have settled the boundary with Russia as well as with Central Asian countries with very nominal territorial adjustments.

During the PM’s January visit to China, press reports indicated that both sides have formulated and tabled their respective drafts of a possible framework agreement involving territorial concessions, and that the Indian side has raised 21 issues on the Chinese draft. This seems to be a confusion caused by officials who elaborate little on the substance of the talks because of their sensitivity and the tendency of the press to make news without much material. A working group of mid-level officials will discuss further the ideas exchanged between the two sides, possibly after the current deliberations of the National Peoples’ Congress are over. On the issue of settled populations, the Chinese are creating room for themselves by seeking their classification into small, medium and dense pockets. Our desire to resolve the long-pending border issue is not only not shared by the Chinese but they are also exploiting it to impose unacceptable conditions.

We let China patronise us, looking for signs of goodwill, be it about a permanent Security Council membership or international civilian nuclear cooperation. On the other hand, such is the complexity of our attitude towards China that we openly speak of developing missiles and submarine capabilities able to reach China’s heartland. There is much virtue in becoming strong, but none in boasting muscles we don’t yet have. The vocal chords of our democracy are often unnecessarily loud.


The writer is a former foreign secretary sibalkanwal@gmail.com